Analysis of a global survey of 21,980 frms from 91 countries suggests that the presence of women in corporate leadership positions may improve frm performance. Tis correlation could refect either the payof to nondiscrimination or the fact that women increase a frm's skill diversity. Women's presence in corporate leadership is positively correlated with frm characteristics such as size as well as national characteristics such as girls' math scores, the absence of discriminatory attitudes toward female executives, and the availability of paternal leave. Te results fnd no impact of board gender quotas on frm performance, but they suggest that the payofs of policies that facilitate women rising through the corporate ranks more broadly could be signifcant.
Women do not participate in the global economy to the same extent as men do. Implicit is a normative question of why this is the case and a positive question of what would be the economic impact if women were to participate more fully in economic life. Te McKinsey Global Institute (2015) estimates that a scenario in which women achieved complete gender parity with men could increase global output by more than one-quarter relative to a business-as-usual scenario.
Te role of women is particularly salient for countries with rapidly aging populations. Emblematic of the exigency of making fuller use of women in the economy has been the Japanese Diet's passage of the Act Concerning the Promotion of Women's Career Activities and the entry of the term womenomics into Japanese economic discourse. In South Korea President Park Geun-hye has pledged to boost women's workforce participation by making public funds available to encourage companies to ofer more fexible schedules and subsidize childcare.
Te relative dearth of women in corporate leadership positions is an emerging political issue. A number of countries, including France, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Spain, have gone so far as to mandate female representation on corporate boards, and other countries are considering following suit.
Several Asian countries are adopting similar policy responses, setting workforce gender balance targets, quotas on corporate boards and political leadership roles, or expanding family-focused policies.
Tis paper addresses the relative absence of women on corporate executive boards and at the upper levels of management globally. It is based on a 2014 sample of 21,980 frms headquartered in 91 countries. Nearly 60 percent of these frms have no female board members, just over half have no female "C-suite" executives (a frm's most senior executives and members of corporate boards), and less than 5 percent have a female chief executive ofcer (CEO).
Te presence of women in corporate leadership is positively correlated with some frm characteristics, such as size, as well as some national characteristics, such as girls' performance on math assessments, the relative absence of discriminatory attitudes toward female executives, and the availability of paternal leave, among others. Te data reveal considerable variation in female representation across regions and countries as well as sectors of the economy.
Past evidence on the impact of female leadership on corporate performance, typically derived from research undertaken in a single country, has been mixed. Examining the economic performance of large US frms, Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader (2003) and Carter et al. (2007) fnd that greater gender balance among corporate leaders is associated with higher stock values and greater proftability. Other research on US frms fnds that mixed-gender boards outperform all-male boards (McKinsey 2012b) and that the Fortune 500 companies with the highest proportion of women on their boards performed signifcantly better than frms with the lowest proportion (Catalyst 2011) . Accounting frm Rothstein Kass (2012) fnds that hedge funds headed by women outperform hedge funds headed by men. More diverse boards have also been found to contribute positively to frm performance in Latin America (McKinsey 2013) and Spain (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 2008) . Some studies fnd greater gender balance gains in particular sectors and circumstances. 1 However, even Carter et al. (2007) , in their generally positive assessment of the impact of diversity on corporate performance, observe that the process through which diversity afects board performance is complex and that while some board functions may beneft from greater gender or racial diversity, others may not.
2 Perhaps not surprisingly, some studies conclude that greater balance has a neutral or even negative impact. In a study of German companies, Lindstädt, Wolf, and Fehre (2011) fnd no overall relationship between female board membership and stock performance. In their study of 2,000 frms, O'Reilly and Main (2008) fnd no evidence that adding women to boards enhances corporate performance and conclude that such appointments are generally undertaken for normative rather than proft-seeking motives.
Tis paper uses a global dataset of nearly 22,000 frms to examine the impact of gender diversity on corporate performance. It then analyzes the correlates with diversity. Caution should be exercised in interpreting the statistical results, which are the product of a single snapshot. Te dearth of cross-national evidence on these issues justifes taking this frst cut.
Te results suggest that the presence of women in corporate leadership positions may improve frm performance and that the magnitudes of the correlations are not small. Te largest gains are for the proportion of female executives, followed by the proportion of female board members; the presence of female CEOs has no noticeable efect on frm performance. Tis pattern underscores the importance of creating a pipeline of female managers and not simply getting lone women to the top.
Te positive correlation between the proportion of women in corporate leadership and frm proftability could refect the existence of discrimination against women executives (which gives nondiscriminating frms an edge) or the fact that the presence of women contributes to skill diversity (to the beneft of the frm). Tere is no evidence that the female board quotas enacted by some countries have had an impact, for good or ill, though the statistical analysis may be too crude to detect such efects.
1. Dezso and Gaddis Ross (2011) fnd that adding women leaders improves performance in innovation-oriented frms. Lindstädt, Wolf, and Fehre (2011) fnd positive results from increasing female leadership in consumer-oriented companies. Tey also fnd that companies that have a large female workforce beneft from having female leaders. Jurkus, Park, and Woodard (2011) fnd that increased gender equity can be benefcial in frms with weak external governance. Te Credit Suisse Research Institute (2012) fnds that companies with women on their boards perform better than companies with all-male boards in challenging markets. Following the 2008 global economic crisis, for example, net income growth for companies with women on their boards averaged 14 percent, compared with 10 percent for companies with all-male boards.
2. One channel for these gains is a more supportive work environment brought about by greater gender balance. Dezso and Gaddis Ross (2011) fnd that female representation in top management brings informational and social diversity benefts, improves the performance of other managers, and helps motivate women in middle management. Adding women may also lead to better board behavior. Adams and Ferreira (2009) fnd that female directors have a positive impact on board inputs (attendance at meetings, participation on committees) and frm outcomes. Tey fnd that more gender-balanced frms devote more time to monitoring and tend to hold CEOs more accountable for poor stock performance.
GENDER BALANCE IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP
We compiled a global dataset from Reuters profles of publicly traded frms in late 2014. Te Reuters data did not explicitly provide identifying information about a frm's home country, top leadership, or the gender identity of corporate leaders (defned here as members of corporate boards and frms' most senior executives). Appendix A describes the techniques used to obtain these data. Only 11 percent of the nearly 130,000 corporate board members in the database and 659 of more than 17,000 board chairs (3.8 percent) are women. Women represent 14 percent of the 144,000 executives in the sample and 4.5 percent of the CEOs of the roughly 22,000 frms. If one accepts the 3. Te 91st "country" comprises 26 frms that could not be linked to a particular country and were therefore not included in the analysis. Most of the Korean data could not be used, because of difculties identifying the gender of corporate leaders (Korean names are notoriously gender-neutral, a well-documented challenge for research of this type; see Yoon et al. 2008 ).
4. Te number of frms is about 600 short of the total because a frm must have had both a nonzero number of executives and a nonzero number of board members identifed as male or female to be sorted. About 600 frms did not.
5. For all but the very largest frms, having 0-5 percent of executives and board members be women is equivalent to employing no such women. For a frm to have women make up less than 5 percent of executives while still employing a nonzero number of female executives, there would have to be 21 or more executives in total. Such frms represent far less than 1 percent of the total.
premise that equally educated women in a workforce are as capable as men of moving into management, this low number is a puzzle worth pursuing.
Te broad averages obscure considerable cross-country and cross-sectoral variation. Figures 2 and 3, which illustrate women's representation on corporate boards and C-level positions for all countries in which 10 or more frms in the dataset are headquartered, highlight the cross-country diferences (see also appendix tables A.1 and A.2). As these maps make clear, although there is some relationship between gender balance and per capita income, the correlation is far from perfect. In East Asia, for example, where per capita income is relatively high, women hold only 6 percent of board positions and just 3 percent of board chairs. Intraregional variation is signifcant, however, with the share of female executives ranging from 2.5 percent in Japan to 13.5 percent in China.
A number of countries have implemented quotas for women on corporate boards ( 
DOES GENDER BALANCE AFFECT FIRM PERFORMANCE?
Tere is no unambiguous theoretical presumption with respect to the impact of gender diversity on corporate performance. Te standard argument is that as frms are value maximizing, if anything could be gained by adding women to corporate leadership positions, they would do so; attempts to force change (by mandating female representation on boards, for example) could be counterproductive (Demsetz and Lehn 1985) . Tis negative outcome might be particularly likely if the new board members (or executives)
were less experienced or of lower quality than men or if, because of the scarcity of qualifed women, the small pool was stretched across too many boards (the "golden skirt" phenomenon). In the case of the Norwegian board quota, there is empirical research on this point, as discussed below.
Te opposite view is that the relative scarcity of women in corporate leadership refects discrimination and that frms that do not discriminate will exhibit superior performance, particularly if women possess unique or diferent skill mixes. Indeed, it has been argued (by Iriyama 2015, for example) that although skill diversity generally contributes to corporate performance, demographic or gender diversity per se does not. In their examination of US publicly traded frms, Kim and Starks (2015) fnd that functional diversity contributes to frm performance and that women bring specifc functional expertise to boards of US frms, thereby enhancing performance.
Finally, the functioning of boards and senior management teams refects complex small group dynamics. Depending on circumstances, introducing women into the mix could either boost or detract from leadership and, by extension, frm performance.
Given such ambiguity, it is perhaps not surprising that empirical evidence on these issues is mixed. Erhardt, Werbal, and Shrader (2003) fnd a positive relationship between the diversity of executive boards and returns on assets and on investments among 112 Fortune-listed US companies. Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) fnd that Fortune-listed US frms with at least two women on their boards exhibit higher Tobin's Q ratios (a measure of frm assets in relation to a frm's market value) than frms with lower female representation.
In contrast, after examining nearly 2,000 frms appearing in various S&P indices, Adams and Ferreira (2009) fnd that gender-diverse boards allocate more efort to monitoring management performance and that as a consequence, CEO turnover is more sensitive to stock performance. Directors also receive more equity-based compensation in more gender-diverse boards. Tey conclude that gender diversity has a negative impact on frm performance on average (frms with more gender-diverse boards have fewer takeover defenses), though for a subset of frms with weak governance, diversity adds value. Smith, Smith, and Verner (2006) and Rose (2007) obtain mixed evidence on the impact of women on boards on frm performance in Denmark.
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Te data examined here both are more extensive and cover a vastly more diverse set of economies than the data used in previous studies. Tables 2 and 3 Consistent with other research, there is no evidence that board quotas have any signifcant impact, positive or negative, on company performance. 9 One concern about the quota system is that in a system 8. Tis variable is equal to the frm's share of female board members when the frm's country of residence has a quota in place and equal to zero otherwise.
9. Tis fnding is consistent with earlier research. Dale-Olsen, Schøne, and Verner (2014) fnd the impact of the Norwegian board quota policy "negligible." In their study of 130 publicly traded frms, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) fnd that the Norwegian reform led to "value losses of upwards of 20 percent for the frms with [no previous female members]," which they attribute to the formation of younger, less experienced boards; increases in leverage and acquisitions; and deterioration of operating with few qualifed women, a small number of women will be invited to sit on the boards of many companies, a phenomenon known as the "golden skirt" efect, and their overcommitment will have a negative impact on monitoring activities. In fact, the data indicate that "golden skirts" are no more prevalent than "golden pants" (fgure 5): 13 percent of male board members sit on two boards, compared with 12 percent of women board members, 3 percent of each gender sit on three boards at the same time, and 1 percent of male and 0.8 percent of female board members sit on four or more boards.
Te evidence on the impact of female executives is more robust. In fve of the six specifcations that include this variable, the coefcient is positive and statistically signifcant-that is, the presence of female executives is associated with unusually strong frm performance. Total female corporate leadership share is estimated with a statistically signifcant positive coefcient in all four of the regressions in which it appears.
As a further check on robustness, we reestimated the regressions excluding small frms, defned as frms with annual revenues of less than $1 million, boards with fewer than fve members, or executive ranks with fewer than fve members. Te results, reported in table 4, reconfrm the results obtained originally: Te evidence on the positive correlation between the share of female board members and frm performance is not robust, but the positive correlation between frm performance and the share of women in upper management is.
Taken together, the pattern of results reported in tables 2-4 suggests a kind of "pipeline"
interpretation of the efect of gender diversity. Tere is no statistically observable impact of having a female CEO, and the impact of women's presence on the board is not statistically robust. However, the correlation between women at the C-suite level and frm proftability is demonstrated repeatedly, and the magnitude of the estimated efects is not small. For example, a proftable frm at which 30 percent of leaders are women could expect to add more than 1 percentage point to its net margin compared with an otherwise similar frm with no female leaders. By way of comparison, the typical proftable frm in our sample had a net proft margin of 6.4 percent, so a 1 percentage point increase represents a 15 percent performance, though they admit that some of these efects might be transitory. Tey also fnd that the negative impact of the Norwegian law was even greater on other Scandinavian countries, suggesting that some common shock (such as the business cycle), not the Norwegian reform, drove the results. Eckbo, Nygaard, and Torburn (2015) fail to fnd evidence of a statistically signifcant change in the market values of domestic frms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange that may be attributable to the quota law. Tey fnd instead that the value loss cited by Ahern and Dittmar was driven not by the gender quota law but by the superior ability of a small set of large government-owned frms to withstand the negative liquidity shock caused by the 2008-09 fnancial crisis. Studies by Matsa and Miller (2013) and Nygaard (2011) reach opposing conclusions: Matsa and Miller (2013) fnd that short-term proft reductions came from fewer workforce reductions compared with other frms and that this efect was particularly strong for frms that had previously had no female board members. Nygaard (2011) fnds that investors were more likely to accept new female directors at frms that had less information asymmetry between frm insiders and outsiders. Tese frms experienced positive and signifcant cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) after introduction of the quota; frms with high information asymmetry saw negative but insignifcant CAR.
boost to proftability. When considering a broader set of frms, both proftable and unproftable, the result is even more striking. For the sample as a whole, the frm with more women can expect a 6 percentage point increase in net proft, while overall median net proft was just over 3 percent. One wonders if similar results would be obtained if one analyzed the organizational ranks below the C-suite.
Tese results, together with the fnding that quotas do not appear to have a signifcant impact on frm performance, suggest that although the boards of publicly traded frms are an easy target for legislators, the payofs for policies that facilitate women rising through the corporate ranks more broadly might be larger. More women on corporate boards might be a way of promoting that outcome: Statistically, there is a correlation between the presence of women on boards and the presence of women in executive ranks. A more gender-balanced board might show greater interest in encouraging a more balanced executive team.
Certain frm and national characteristics are robustly correlated with the presence of women not only on boards but also in upper management more generally.
WOMEN'S PRESENCE IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP
Given the relatively large dispersion of cross-country outcomes (fgures 2 and 3) relative to the less dispersed cross-sectoral results (fgure 4), one might expect that country characteristics are driving the observed outcomes. Table 5 , which reports an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on both the women's share of board and executive positions, confrms this hypothesis. For both corporate boards and executives, all three groupings (country-specifc, sector-specifc, and country/sector-specifc categorical variables) explain a signifcant degree of variation in women's representation, but country variation accounts for the largest shares. Tese factors alone do not explain the majority of the variation across frms, but the results justify additional focus on national characteristics in explaining women's representation in corporate leadership.
Te observed outcomes are presumably a function of individual characteristics intermediated by national institutional structures broadly defned. Educational credentials and work experience are the key attributes. A 2015 survey of international professional leaders revealed that more than 80 percent had university degrees and 38 percent held advanced degrees (British Council 2015) . To lead a company it is also helpful to have worked in the industry; the business literature fnds signifcant returns to years of experience (see Pande and Ford 2011) . If women were not obtaining the relevant educational credentials or participating in the workforce, it would be unsurprising that they were not moving up the corporate ladder.
Social attitudes, corporate practices, and national laws may be conditioning outcomes. Tey could range from cultural attitudes that discourage women's advancement in the commercial sphere to outright gender discrimination to corporate practices (such as low turnover on boards), which would slow the 9 integration of new, and potentially demographically diferent, board members to policies such as quotas that mandate a certain level of participation.
10 Table 6 10. A survey of 17,000 American and 2,800 non-American middle and high school students suggests that attitudes toward female leadership may be ingrained early on: Both boys and girls expressed preferences for male leaders, even as leadership pathways for girls are increasingly clear (Weissbourd 2015) .
11. Te average age in the sample is 50 for female executives and 55 for female board members. Tese women would have graduated from business school in the late 1980s through the 1990s. Data on too few countries are available for the years before 1999.
for some countries in the sample. Te gap in male versus female participation in the labor force is almost three times as great in the 10 least gender-balanced countries in the sample as it is in the 10 most genderbalanced countries (see appendix table A.2). On average, however, the male-female gap in the professional workforce is low, -1 for the sample as a whole and -10 for the bottom 10 countries. In the United States, for example, 40 percent of managers are women (US BLS 2014). Labor force participation can thus not explain the consistently low numbers of female leaders. Table 6 includes two indicators of social policy: paternity leave and maternity leave. In most societies, to varying degrees, women are more likely than men to take on the double burden of work and familyand to be expected to do so. Indicative of the lower priority put on paternity leave, it is reported in days whereas maternity leave is reported in weeks. than the average or bottom countries. Paternity leave is signifcantly greater in the most gender-balanced host countries, with the top 10 countries ofering 11 times more paternity leave days than the bottom 10.
Even in societies that do not sufer from cultural biases against women's participation in the technical and professional workforce, women by and large assume a greater share of child care and household
responsibilities. An oft-cited reason for women not reaching the top of the corporate ladder is the so-called mommy track-the diminished career opportunities faced by women who bear or might bear children. As women take maternity leave and require more fexible hours to care for their children, they are unable-or perceived as unable-to undertake the level of commitment required to become corporate leaders. Firms may be loath to groom or promote as leaders individuals they expect may take extensive leave and who may derail mid-career.
Te evidence that having children leads women to opt out of the labor force is weak. In the United
States about 10 percent of women leave the workforce to raise children (Kanter and Roessner 2003; Ely, Stone, and Ammerman 2014) . Women may ramp down their career ambitions to devote more time to family care-and may be expected to do so more than men: Te survey by Ely, Stone, and
Ammerman fnds that even among men and women who are equally successful and ambitious at the time of graduation, men's career advancement is valued over women's. In a longitudinal study of Denmark, Pertold-Gebicka, Pertold, and Gupta (2016) fnd that women exhibit a higher propensity to leave the private sector for the public sector and a lower propensity to exit public sector employment around the time of the birth of their frst child.
Parental leave policies are a proxy for support for policies directed at childcare. Although an imperfect proxy-a more robust indicator would also take into account workplace fexibility, access to afordable daycare, and other forms of childcare support-they provide information regarding attitudes toward childcare in a society and the childcare means available to parents during the early and most laborintensive months (or years).
Perhaps surprisingly, mandated maternity leave is not correlated with female corporate leadership shares, though paternity leave is strongly correlated with the female share of board seats, signifcant at the 0.001 level. Tis issue is worthy of further consideration. One might have expected to fnd a signifcant and positive result for maternity leave-that is, countries that provide mothers with more generous terms for caring for their babies and toddlers should have larger shares of female leaders-but the data do not fnd this to be the case. If these correlations are interpreted causally, one could argue that countries in which fathers have access to more leave have signifcantly more women on corporate boards. It stands to reason that policies that allow childcare needs to be met but do not place the burden of care explicitly on women increase the chances that women can build the business acumen and professional contacts necessary to qualify for a corporate board. More gender-neutral family leave (and more supportive childcare institutions more generally) would also cut of the expectation by employers that young men will necessarily provide greater returns to training and mentoring than young women.
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Tis interpretation of this result suggests that policies that place a disproportionate burden of childcare on women are one barrier to female corporate advancement.
It is possible that the demonstration efect of seeing women as political leaders could have an impact, paving the way for women to break into corporate leadership. Female political leaders may also be more likely to promulgate policies that encourage gender equity. Table 6 includes two indicators of female political infuence, the share of female parliamentarians and the share of female cabinet ministers, both part of the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Index. Neither is strongly correlated with female corporate leadership, consistent with the conclusion of Pande and Ford (2011) that there is very little evidence of spillovers from gender advances in the sphere of political leadership to corporate leadership.
Multivariate regressions are reported on the female share of board members (tables 8 and 10), C-suite executives (tables 9 and 10), and CEOs and board chairs ( In the six specifcations reported in table 8, the presence of a female CEO, the size of the board, and the size of the frm as measured by revenue are all positively correlated with the share of women on the board. In terms of country characteristics, in specifcation (2) Similar results are obtained for the female executive share in table 9. Te coefcients on the frm characteristics are all statistically signifcant, with the expected signs. In specifcation (2) the math scores and shares of social science/business/law graduates are statistically signifcant, but the overall tertiary enrollment rate is not. In specifcation (3) the income gap is statistically signifcant, but in contrast to specifcation (3) in table 8, the female labor force participation is not whereas the female share of professional and technical workers has a strong impact. In specifcations (4), (5), and (6) in table 9, all of the institutional, political, and social policy variables are signifcant at the 0.001 level, as was the case in table 8.
14. All "share" and "ratio" variables use the same scale, on both the left-and right-hand sides of the equation. Te values for parity are 1 for ratios and 0.5 for shares.
15. Te Norway dummy is retained to capture the impact of the board quota, which appears to be binding. Te female board share is 40 percent in Norway, 23 percent in Finland, 22 percent in Sweden, and 18 percent in Denmark.
Issues with sample coverage mean that inclusion of some variables alone or in combination can have a substantial impact on sample size. Table 10 reports eight regressions in which the variables from table   6 are combined, four for each dependent variable, with the specifcations arranged in increasing order of sample truncation. Some of the correlations are very robust, others less so. All of the frm characteristicsthe presence of a female CEO, the size of the board, and the size of the frm-are robustly and positively correlated with the female corporate leadership shares. Girls' relative performance on the PISA in math is positively and robustly correlated with the female share of corporate boards and C-level executive ranks, though inclusion of this variable, available only for OECD countries and a few select nonmembers, reduces the sample size considerably. Te ratio of female to male income is statistically signifcant in fve of eight specifcations. Most of the coefcients on attitudes toward female executives, the ratio of paternity to maternity leave, and the extent of inward FDI are statistically signifcant, with the expected sign, but in each case one instance is estimated with a statistically signifcant unexpected sign. Table 11 reports probit regressions on the presence of women as CEOs or board chairs. Te probability of having a female CEO is strongly and positively associated with the presence of women on the board and weakly negatively associated with frm size. As noted previously, however, if the board chair is female, there must be at least one woman on the board. So in specifcation (3), the simple female board share is dropped from the specifcation and replaced with a count that excludes the chair herself.
Te female board share excluding the chairwoman is still positively and signifcantly correlated with the presence of a female board chair, but frm size now exhibits a weak positive correlation.
Specifcations (4) and (5) include variables relating to national characteristics. As might be expected
given that the ascent of a single individual to the pinnacle is being modeled, virtually no national characteristics are signifcantly correlated with these outcomes.
CONCLUSION
A global survey of nearly 22,000 frms reveals the relative dearth of women in high leadership positions.
Almost 60 percent of these frms have no female board members, just over half have no female "C-suite" executives, and roughly one-third of the sample has no women in either C-level or board positions. Tere is evidence of both cross-sectoral and cross-country variation in these patterns, with the cross-country dispersion much larger.
Te survey represents a snapshot; the results should therefore be interpreted cautiously. Collection of additional data to construct a panel would help distinguish causality from mere correlation. Nevertheless,
given that previous studies have been generally limited to one or several OECD economies, the sheer size and breadth of the dataset, including frms headquartered in 91 countries, justifes a careful examination of the data.
Te results suggest that the presence of women on corporate boards and in the C-suite may contribute to frm performance. Te impact is greatest for female executive shares, followed by female board shares; the presence of female CEOs has no noticeable efect. Tis pattern underscores the importance of creating a pipeline of female managers and not simply getting women to the very top.
Te estimated magnitudes of these correlations are not small: For proftable frms, a move from no female leaders to 30 percent representation is associated with a 15 percent increase in the net revenue margin. Tis estimate, derived from a cross-section, may well diminish if reestimated in a panel setting and is surely subject to diminishing returns. Nevertheless, the robustness of this result from a global dataset warrants further study.
Te positive correlation between the presence of women in corporate leadership and proftability could refect the existence of discrimination against women executives, which gives nondiscriminating frms an edge. Alternatively, it could be that the presence of women contributes to superior performance via functional diversity.
What explains the relative scarcity of women in corporate leadership? Te statistical results suggest that at the frm level, the size of the company and the size of the board are robustly correlated with the presence of women on boards and in the C-suite (though not as CEOs). Te results also suggest that a set of national characteristics-including high scores on math assessments, concentrations in degree programs associated with management, and the ratio of female to male income, which could be interpreted as indicators of institutional openness to women's success-is robustly correlated with these outcomes. Te results also point to other correlates that could be overlooked, including discriminatory societal attitudes, the importance of paternity as well as maternity leave, and openness to foreign investment, which could be interpreted as greater tolerance for new ways of doing business.
Te analysis uncovered no evidence of signifcant efects of the female board quotas some countries have imposed. Te statistical analysis may be too crude to discern such efects if they exist, however.
Moreover, if increased gender diversity in corporate leadership contributes to frm performance, if quotas have negligible costs, and if the presence of women in the C-suite enhances the pipeline efect by encouraging more women to pursue these positions, as is often claimed, then some kind of quota system may warrant consideration, particularly if the dearth of women in these positions at least in part refects pure discrimination. As Eckbo, Nygaard, and Torburn (2015) observe, "Nomination of new board members may be limited by existing networks and a biased search process." 16 Mandating a percentage of women on boards for a set number of years, for example, could mitigate such biases.
16. Agarwal et al. (2015) fnd that a woman's likelihood of serving on the board of a publicly traded company in Singapore more than doubles if she plays golf, suggesting that the impact of social networks in even apparently trivial settings is signifcant.
Te efectiveness of a quota could turn on women's status further down the corporate ladder. If women face a glass ceiling just below the top leadership level, a quota should be relatively painless, even in the short run. In contrast, if women struggle to reach upper management, a quota would carry heavier short-run costs. In this case it might be better to pursue policies that help women in the middle of their careers before directly addressing board membership. Indeed, the results suggest that the real economic payofs are to increasing gender diversity in the C-suite, not on boards. To the extent that there is a correlation between the presence of women on boards and the presence of women in executive ranks, a board quota might facilitate diversity more broadly, which should be the ultimate goal.
A number of measures could mitigate potential negative efects of quotas. Te Netherlands' quota system has an expiration data, included in order to test the efects of the policy. Having an expiration for a legislative quota would be akin to infant industry protection in the trade theory literature: It would allow the underrepresented group a period of time to build up experience and network mechanisms, put in place training mechanisms for following cohorts, and allow exposure to female corporate leaders. Once these mechanisms are in place long enough that a cadre of women prepared for leadership exists, the quota could be removed.
Another option-expanding the board to add more women but not at the expense of qualifed men-comes from the world of sports. Te International Triathlon Union, the governing body of the sport, mandates that a certain percent of leadership be women but allows for the addition of an extra board seat for every extra woman brought on board. Further work will be needed to tease out the precise channels of causality latent in these results and inform how vigorously such initiatives should be pursued, if at all. At a minimum the results from this global survey suggest promising directions for understanding both the impact of gender diversity on frm performance and the underlying drivers of diversity itself. In order to get a snapshot of the frm, we constructed a database from the Reuters "fnancials" section (principally performance ratios), the "people" section (which includes information on top corporate leaders), the fnancial statement, and the frm profle. All of these data were available for roughly 22,000 frms, the frms included in our database. An early concern was how to discern which country should be considered a frm's home. Reuters associates each listing with a country, but the country corresponds with the location of the index rather than the frm. Tus a single frm could be associated with several countries. To solve this issue, we used the address given by the Reuters company profle, which included a phone number and in most cases a fax number. We were able to associate almost all frms with a country based on the phone number. 19 In the (rare) case where a phone number was not given, was invalid, or was listed as non-country-specifc 1-800 or similar number, the same method was applied to the fax number.
Using this method, we identifed home countries for all but about two dozen frms. Next we identifed the role of the individuals listed on a frm's "People" page, based on the positions listed by Reuters. A program used an extensive list of titles associated with the top executive (presidents and CEOs) and board (chairs)
positions. However, because titles are not uniform across countries, frm-specifc consideration was 17. Stock Screener is available at http://stockscreener.us.reuters.com/Stock/US/Index?quickscreen=gaarp.
18. Reuters appears to have no data on some exchanges, most notably the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Our dataset excludes frms listed only on a missing exchange.
19. Te United States, Canada, and the Caribbean countries share the same country calling code (1). An additional step was needed to distinguish the nationality for frms in these countries. In the process we also assigned a state or province to US and Canadian frms based on the area code.
required. British companies, for example, often designate their top executive as the "managing director," a title that indicates a position below the CEO in other countries. Germany's corporate structure is diferent in more fundamental ways. 20 To get around this problem, we did not consider titles that were awarded to multiple individuals in a given frm as the top position, with some exceptions. 21 Te program was able to categorize individuals for each frm as being a president/CEO, chair of the board, board member, or executive. Board chairs were counted as board members, and CEOs were counted as executives.
Individuals could, and often did, appear as both an executive and a director, if they held titles consistent with both roles. We did not double count any individual holding multiple titles consistent with a specifc role. For example, an individual holding the titles "President" and "Chief Executive Ofcer" would not be counted twice as a top-level executive (or an executive in general).
Te program identifed more than 135,000 board members, 18,000 board chairs, 150,000 executives, and 22,000 top-level executives. Not all frms reported a board of directors. Some frms were relatively small, and in some jurisdictions (most notably Japan) many frms followed a corporate structure that did not designate a clear equivalent position. With that categorization complete, we next attempted to discern the gender of each individual. Te frst step in this regard was to defer to Reuters. Te "People" page often contained brief bios of listed individuals. If those bios used a gendered pronoun or referred to an individual as "Mrs.", "Ms.", or "Mr.", we assumed that Reuters had correctly identifed the gender of the individual in question. Tis method allowed us to identify the gender of two-thirds of individuals.
Te gender of the remaining 100,000 individuals had to be identifed by other means. To do so, we relied on a database that categorizes frst names as strongly male/female, weakly male/female, or neutral. 22 For example, "Barbara" is strongly female, "Tyler" is weakly male, and "Skyler" is neutral. To test the accuracy of this method, we compared the gender indicated by the program with the gender given by Reuters.
Te program returned the incorrect gender in just 1.6 percent of cases (3,325 of the roughly 206,000 individuals in the database). Based on these criteria, we identifed the gender breakdown of a frm's board and top executives and aggregated those data into sector, subsector, country, and regional groups. 20. For Germany the chairs of the supervisory and management boards were taken as equivalent to the chair of the board of director and the CEO, respectively.
21. Two individuals holding the title "co-president" would both be considered top executives, for example. 
